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BUILDING DEMOCRACIES WITH SOUTHERN COMMAND'S 
LEGAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY  
America has conducted itself in the post-Cold War era with the understanding 
that fostering democracies and encouraging military establishments subject to 
the rule of law are vital to US national security interests.[ 1] In this regard, the 
warfighting unified commands mirror the overall US national security policy of 
peacetime engagement not only by maintaining close contacts with allies and 
friendly governments for the purpose of imparting values and ideals associated 
with democratic principles, but by focusing this commitment through detailed 
engagement plans.  
For example, in a document entitled "Strategy of Cooperative Regional 
Peacetime Engagement," General Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander in Chief of US 
Southern Command from 1997 to 2000 (now retired), set out his vision for Latin 
America and the Caribbean as "a community of democratic, stable, and 
prosperous nations ... served by professional, modernized, interoperable security 
forces that embrace democratic principles, demonstrate respect for human 
rights, are subordinate to civil authority, and are capable and supportive of 
multilateral responses to challenges."[ 2]  
In addition, recognizing that there is a legal dimension to almost every aspect of 
the US Southern Command engagement plan, the Office of the Staff Judge 
Advocate developed and published a first-ever legal engagement strategy in 
[1998.3] The intent of the legal engagement strategy is to promote the concept 
of professional law-based militaries that operate in accordance with the rule of 
law, respect internationally recognized human rights[,4] and are subordinate to 
and controlled by democratically elected civilian governments, in short, the US 
Southern Command legal engagement strategy is a blueprint for democracy-
building in the context of the rule of law. In the quest for war avoidance, this 
legal engagement plan is a unique force multiplier and contributes to the 
"shaping" dimension of the National Military Strategy.  
The Importance of the Rule of Law in War Avoidance  
In his groundbreaking book about warfare in the 21st century, Race to the Swift, 
Richard Simpkin argues that democracies must find "politico-legal devices" to 
confront the enemies that threaten today's societies, and that the armed forces 
of a democracy must carry out their duties in conformity with the rule of law. 
Simpkin states, "Democratic governments rest on the rule of law, and must so 
rest[.5]  
The term "rule of law" was initially coined to refer to the common law system of 
jurisprudence with particular emphasis on equality before the courts. The more 
modern common meaning, however, encompasses those rules and legal 
standards of behavior recognized and practiced between states in the context of 
the community of nations, and connotes consistency in the application of 
democratically passed and impartially implemented and enforced national laws 
and regulations. In the words of University of Virginia law professor John Norton 
Moore, the importance of the rule of law is central to international relations: 
"Law ... is vitally important. Even in the short run, the [rule of] law serves as a 
standard of appraisal for national actions and as a means of communicating 
intentions to both friend and foe, and perceptions about lawfulness can 
profoundly influence both national and international support for particular 
actions."[ 6]  
In tandem with Professor Moore's admonishment, the Clinton Administration's 
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, said that of all the problems facing the 
Southern Hemisphere, none is more important than improving adherence to the 
rule of law. "Where justice is absent," Albright writes, "peace and stability of a 
nation and its neighbors come under threat; where justice is partial, citizens who 
do not have access to equal treatment lose faith in their government, and the 
forces of extremism grow strong; and where justice is unprofessional, crime 
flourishes, corruption grows, and economies suffer."[ 7] If it is obvious that 
justice cannot be achieved without adherence to the rule of law by all levels of 
society, it is particularly true that a nation's military and security forces must also 
embrace the rule of law.  
Promoting the rule of law is not merely an end worthy unto itself; in the quest 
for war avoidance and promoting the full range of human rights, there are great 
benefits to both the United States and the world at large. In fact, recognizing a 
nexus between the nation that mistreats its own citizens and the nation that 
fosters aggression against its neighbors, both the preamble and Article 1 of the 
UN Charter leave no doubt that justice, human rights, and the fundamental 
freedoms of all mankind are at risk, and aggressive war an almost inevitable 
outcome, when democratic principles and the rule of law are ignored.[ 8]  
In other words, the fostering of democracies makes the world more secure 
because, in the words of former national security advisor Anthony Lake, 
"Democracies tend not to wage war on each other and they tend not to support 
terrorism--in fact, they don't."[ 9] Indeed, it seems intuitively obvious that 
activities pursued by democracies are substantially better than the activities 
pursued by totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, which characteristically exhibit a 
blatant disregard for the rule of law.  
So, as many commentators have noted, the new paradigm for war avoidance 
turns out to be a very straightforward model: If democracies make better 
neighbors, it is certainly in the best interests of the United States to do all it can 
to foster all emerging democracies and to thereby enlarge respect for the rule of 
law in international relations. If democracies are better neighbors, the United 
States must expend the necessary time, effort, and capital to effectively assist 
those nations that have exhibited the political will to embark on democracy's 
path. And nowhere has the desire for democracy and the rejection of repression 
been more evident than in the amazing, and still ongoing, transformation of 
governments in Latin America.  
The Military in the Emerging Democracies of Latin America  
Latin America's desire for democracy is seen in the remarkable transformation 
that has taken place in the context of how people are governed. Just over ten 
years ago some 90 percent of Latin American countries functioned under some 
form of undemocratic military rule. Today, all but one of these countries operate 
under popularly elected civilian governments. The Western Hemisphere is now 
virtually all democratic, Cuba being the most obvious exception. Nevertheless, as 
one would expect, a number of Latin American countries are experiencing 
serious troubles in establishing or maintaining the institutions necessary for the 
full blessings of democracy.  
While assistance to the democracies in Latin America is needed at every possible 
level, of utmost concern in the evolutionary transition from totalitarianism to 
democracy is defining the appropriate role of the military forces there. In Latin 
America, the militaries of the new democracies are often a decisive factor in who 
governs. Unfortunately, the chief legacy of the undemocratic past is that those 
militaries have a limited frame of reference for operating under principles 
associated with the rule of law. On the contrary, coming out of a tradition in 
which the ruling elite of the totalitarian state maintained power by using special 
units of the armed forces as a primary instrument of repression against the 
people, in many cases the military itself was viewed as the chief abuser of 
human rights.[ 10]  
Simply put, the totalitarian regimes relied on components of the military 
establishment to maintain power and to suppress any threat--internal or 
external--by any means. Human rights, the rule of law, and civilian control were 
alien concepts. Thus, if the new democracies are to stabilize and flourish, 
subordinating the military to civilian control befitting a democratic system in 
which the soldier can carry out his mission in accordance with the principles of 
human rights is absolutely essential. In short, a hallmark of a successful 
democracy is the military's full acceptance of the fundamental principles of the 
rule of law.  
A law-based military is a key component of successful democratic reform. In a 
democracy, the military cannot be an independent actor; it must take directions 
from the government and be accountable to society for the way it carries out 
those directions. The central question, then, is how best to help instill solid rule-
of-law values in the armed forces. Since rule-of-law values become solid and 
irreversible only through the development of institutions designed to promote 
them, institutionalization must be the criterion. Teaching a few classes to a 
military audience on US democratic traditions, for instance, is not a solution. 
Rule-of-law values must be institutionalized through a systematic approach that 
provides the necessary inculcation. Remarkably, the leaders of military and 
security forces throughout the Latin American region have embraced--or at least 
recognized and accepted--the need for civilian control of the government, 
including the military, and in many cases, their efforts to promote military reform 
have served as the catalyst for institutional changes in the nation's civilian 
political institutions.  
Legal Engagement Model  
Promoting the rule of law in the new democracies involves questions and issues 
which, because of their disparate nature, cannot be assigned to the jurisdiction 
of any single agency or department of the US government. Still, because of the 
nature of the problem--promoting the full range of rule-of-law issues to host-
nation militaries--the matter is best spearheaded by the US military's uniformed 
lawyers, its judge advocates.[ 11] Judge advocates serve as an action-based 
resource capable of advising and responding to a variety of legal problems. 
Traditionally, judge advocates are tasked to provide support to the US military in 
the context of military justice, military administration, legal assistance, contracts, 
procurement, international law, and law-of-war issues. In general, the principal 
function of any judge advocate is to provide advice on legal matters to the 
commander and his staff to ensure that all activities are carried out in 
accordance with US domestic and international law.  
The very existence of a uniformed legal corps serves as a way to institutionalize 
the American commitment to the positive values of military proficiency and 
ethical integrity in the armed forces. In addition, by doctrine, lawyers oversee all 
of the regulatory requirements associated with providing training in the laws of 
war[ 12] and code of conduct to all US soldiers.[ 13] As a result, few militaries in 
history can match the record of the US military as it has functioned under the 
rule of law, whether in the realm of respecting the law of armed conflict, 
providing a fair system of justice for its soldiers, or operating under civilian 
control.[ 14]  
The Southern Command's lawyers faced a novel and formidable challenge in 
crafting an effective legal strategy to support the unified commander's 
engagement efforts while taking into account US operational and security 
concerns, cultural diversity, mistrust of US intentions, resentment of US power 
and influence, unfamiliarity with different legal systems that were oftentimes 
dysfunctional and corrupt, and a natural resistance to change. Nevertheless, 
after recognizing the key role a proactive rule-of-law program would play in 
supporting Southern Command's theater engagement efforts, the Staff Judge 
Advocate's Office conceived and crafted a coherent legal engagement strategy to 
help build rule-of-law programs, effect necessary reforms within the military 
justice systems of those countries interested in reform, and support military 
reformers within the national ministries of defense in their efforts to 
professionalize and legitimize their military and security forces. This legal 
engagement strategy focuses on working cooperatively with nations in the 
region, other government agencies, and international organizations[ 15] in order 
to reinforce the importance of military institutions embracing the rule of law by 
adhering to domestic laws and international legal standards of behavior.  
The cornerstone of Southern Command's legal engagement strategy is an annual 
symposium called the "Legal Symposium on Defense and Security Issues," held 
annually in Miami, Florida. The symposium is an intensive four-day conference 
that brings together the senior military leaders and their legal advisors from 
throughout the region. The purpose of the symposium is to fully explore the 
relationship that exists between commanders and their military legal advisors in 
a democracy. Because effective legal reform requires the full support of the 
senior leaders of the host nation, the symposium places special emphasis on 
demonstrating to the senior foreign line officers the necessity of a law-based 
professional military legal corps, and the importance of the rule of law in meeting 
regional threats and challenges. This is accomplished through detailed lectures, 
panel discussions, and working sessions devoted to real-world issues. 
Throughout these exchanges, concrete examples are provided on how military 
legal advisors can act as force multipliers over the full range of operational 
issues.  
As a by-product of the annual symposium, a number of defense ministries have 
requested US assistance in defining how the law should properly function in their 
military establishments and, further, how the military itself should fit into a more 
democratic form of government that is serious about promoting human rights. 
The Staff Judge Advocate's Office serves as a forward-based resource capable of 
advising and responding to the variety of problems, sometimes enormous, 
confronting many of the emerging and struggling democracies. This support 
ranges from supplying basic information on how the US military adheres to the 
rule of law, drafting codes of military justice, reforming antiquated military 
justice systems, and assisting the foreign militaries in creating and training their 
own professional legal corps.  
Obviously, in a constrained resource environment, all the requests cannot be 
pursued simultaneously. Therefore, consistent with the priorities established by 
US Southern Command's Strategic Engagement Plan, the legal office focuses on 
those areas and countries that have the highest priority for support. Priority is 
determined by a number of factors, including the importance of the country to 
US national security interests, a demonstrated willingness to effect reforms 
within the military, and support from the civilian leadership. Furthermore, a 
primary concern in the assessment process centers on how effectively, over the 
long-term, a nation's military leadership can be encouraged to accept a reduced 
and more professional role appropriate to a democracy and remain loyal to a 
democratically elected civilian government.  
A successful strategy to achieve this long-term goal must be based on two 
overall themes directed toward the host military and appropriate government 
officials: ( 1) foster greater respect for, and understanding of, the principle of 
civilian control of the military; and ( 2) improve military justice systems and 
procedures to comport with internationally recognized standards of human 
rights.[ 16]  
Two examples of US Southern Command's ongoing legal engagement efforts are 
representative--one in Colombia and the other in Venezuela.  
Colombian Human Rights Training  
Recognizing that the militaries in many of the emerging and struggling 
democracies have a slim frame of reference for properly handling human rights 
issues, a major focus of the legal engagement strategy is to promote, 
strengthen, and assist the host nation's armed forces in institutionalizing human 
rights training. A representative and highly successful example of how the legal 
engagement plan operates is seen in a recently completed two-year project to 
fully institutionalize human rights training in the Colombian military. This long-
term assistance effort stands as a model for other rule-of-law initiatives in other 
regions.  
One of the major obstacles in imparting concepts relating to human rights and 
democratic principles is that many of the democracies in Latin America are 
typically faced with the social and economic turmoil traditionally associated with 
low-intensity-conflict environments, ranging from economic chaos to actual 
armed insurgency. Thus, the effectiveness of any program of assistance must be 
measured against the realities associated with the specific problems facing the 
host nation.  
Nowhere in the world do the multiple forces of insurgency, terrorism, and drug-
trafficking threaten social order more than in Colombia. Foremost in the 
Colombian fight for survival is maintaining the legitimacy of the military as it 
conducts operations against a number of insurgency groups, foremost of which is 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). A major step in solidifying 
the legitimacy issue is to inculcate human rights and law-of-armed-conflict 
training into the government's armed forces.  
In October 1998, the then-Deputy Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, 
Major General Alfred Valenzuela, directed the legal office to assist the Colombian 
military in institutionalizing human rights and law-of-war training in the nation's 
entire armed forces. General Valenzuela personally secured the support of the 
Colombian Ministry of Defense to this end and was absolutely instrumental in 
subsequently obtaining the necessary funding from the Secretary of the Army's 
Latin American Cooperation Fund.[ 17]  
While the Colombians expressed a desire to receive human rights instruction, 
there was little, if any, standardized methodology to teach human rights to its 
soldiers. There existed no military legal facility designed and equipped to train 
Colombian commanders in these specialized legal areas. Clearly, Colombian 
soldiers in the field had to be given adequate and meaningful human rights 
training if they were to be held accountable and if they were expected to be 
better prepared to cope with the abuses of terrorists. Furthermore, this training 
had to be institutionalized into the fabric of the Colombian military system so 
that human rights training would be a continuous requirement for all soldiers. 
Cultural, language, and social barriers suggested the best chance for success 
would be for Colombian instructors to deliver the actual subject-matter 
presentations.  
Ultimately, the legal office, working in conjunction with Southern Command's 
Human Rights Division,[ 18] the International Committee of the Red Cross, and 
Colombian human rights experts, developed and then executed a concept plan 
that produced a human rights and law-of-war handbook to be used as the 
standard training guide for the entire Colombian military. Over 500,000 copies of 
the handbook were printed in Colombia, and a cadre of Colombian officers was 
trained in two train-the-trainer courses on how to "teach the handbook." The 
end state of this project is to have Colombian instructors train every soldier and 
to institutionalize the handbook's contents as mandatory training for all future 
soldiers.  
The apparent success of this effort in Colombia must be tempered by the fact 
that human rights training can be effective only to the degree that it is inculcated 
into the psyche of the military. At a minimum, the Colombians now have a 
standardized human rights training handbook that is truly their own. It is now up 
to the Colombians to continue the effort. In this regard, the strategy to keep the 
US role as that of a helper and not as an overseer has paid tremendous 
dividends. If the Colombian military is successful in coming years, the success 
will be due to their continuing commitment to teach human rights and the law of 
war. Teaching and training, of course, must go hand-in-hand with investigating 
abuses and holding the guilty accountable. As a by-product of this initial effort 
and continued engagement with the Colombian senior military leadership, US 
Southern Command is currently providing assistance in creating a new 
Colombian military legal corps as well as instituting additional military justice 
reforms. While much work remains to be done, one cannot help but be 
cautiously optimistic that we have planted the seeds of a professional military 
organization, free from corruption and accountable to its citizens.  
Venezuelan Military Justice Reform  
In Venezuela the focus was different. After the 1998 symposium, Venezuelan 
military officials requested Southern Command's assistance in creating, as 
mandated by new legislation, a completely new court-martial system with oral 
advocacy as its centerpiece. Traditionally, criminal and civil justice systems in 
Latin America have not used adversarial courtroom proceedings to render 
judgments. Appointed judges act as prosecutor, defense attorney, judge, and 
jury. Written testimonials are gathered, other documentary evidence is submitted 
by the parties concerned, and the judge, with no imperative for expeditious 
processing, eventually renders a decision. As a result, defendants often 
languished for years in jail awaiting trial unless they could bribe their way out. 
The decisionmaking process was usually secretive, and judges were never held 
accountable for their judgments. Indeed, there was no way of determining how 
judges arrived at their verdicts, and the system was obviously prone to 
corrupting and illegitimate influences.  
The Venezuelan justice system was typical of this endemic problem. 
Consequently, the Venezuelan legislature passed a law requiring both civilian and 
military courts to change to a system similar to the adversarial process used in 
the United States. At a loss as to how to proceed, the Venezuelan Ministry of 
Defense requested Southern Command's assistance. After several meetings and 
visits to observe US trial procedures, a plan of action and milestones were 
developed and approved by both sides.  
Over a period of approximately ten months, US judge advocates, working closely 
with their Venezuelan counterparts, drafted a new manual for courts-martial, set 
up training programs for Venezuelan military lawyers, conceived and drafted 
procedures for the conduct of trials, and arranged for visits to Puerto Rico to 
observe adversarial trials as they were conducted in the Spanish language. As a 
result of these intensive efforts, on 1 July 1999 the Venezuelan military 
inaugurated the first-ever adversarial trial system in all of South America. Since 
then, Southern Command has continued to make available various training 
programs. For instance, Southern Command provided funding for a team of 
experts from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology to provide training on the 
use of scientific test results and their introduction into evidence. Additionally, US 
judge advocates have been provided as trial observers to offer follow-on advice 
and assistance in the development of trial advocacy skills. Interestingly, the 
civilian court counterpart to the military justice system, which was supposed to 
have also converted to the adversarial system, has not yet, at this writing, 
implemented the legislatively mandated reforms. However, civilian court officials 
have started sending prosecutors and other attorneys to the military lawyer 
training courses and are using the newly instituted military justice system and 
procedures as the model for their reform efforts.  
Southern Command subsequently has received a number of requests to support 
comparable changes in military justice systems throughout the region. Similar 
efforts are currently under way in Honduras and Guatemala, and plans are being 
developed to support requests from Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and 
Bolivia.  
Lessons Learned  
The Colombian and Venezuelan initiatives serve as a blueprint for the Southern 
Command's legal engagement plan. From these two cases, eight general points 
are worthy of consideration.  
• First, as demonstrated throughout the Colombian initiative, any program to 
promote human rights values within foreign militaries must be built upon 
institutionalizing those values into the fabric of that force. Obviously, this goal 
can be achieved only through a systematic program designed to institutionalize 
these concepts. In the past, the United States has not recognized the importance 
of institutional reform. Instead, US programs relied on a variety of disjointed 
military security assistance initiatives to try to instill human rights values 
compatible with democratic principles in individual foreign soldiers. Since US 
efforts were geared only at exposing the individual foreign soldier to human 
rights ideals, institutional reform within the host-nation military never occurred. 
Essentially, the promotion of human rights and democracy was an indirect, 
hoped-for benefit at best rather than an explicit goal. Programs designed merely 
to have US personnel teach human rights or the law of armed conflict on one or 
more occasions will have only limited long-term results and will fail to instill pride 
and responsibility into the host military, which comes from designing and 
delivering their own human rights curricula for training.  
This "train-the-trainers" approach is distinguishable from any other program in 
that it assimilates the target country's military command structure at all stages of 
the process in the development of a course to train its own soldiers in human 
rights law. This approach promises success because the target military is more 
likely to follow through with programs if its top military commanders have 
invested the time and resources needed to develop them. There is a direct 
positive correlation between the host nation viewing the program as an 
indigenous effort and the amount of real support that is provided. The concept of 
training the trainer places the cost and the reward where it belongs, with the 
host country.  
• Second, formal requests for these types of long-term assistance must 
always originate from the recipient government. Again, this is the purpose 
of the annual legal symposium. In this way, the matter of assistance is 
never framed as to what the United States is going to do, but what the 
two nations can do together. In this manner, the host nation is engaged 
in the reform effort at the beginning of the process. In Colombia, the idea 
of developing some type of effective human rights training had been 
percolating for several years. In Venezuela, the military leadership looks 
to the United States and Southern Command as the best place to support 
its mandated legal reform efforts. Furthermore, since the US 
representatives in-country best know the local politics and personalities, 
their complete support is essential. The lesson to apply in future efforts is 
fundamental: only a unified US team working together with its host-nation 
counterparts toward a common long-term objective will be able to launch 
and sustain a successful program.  
• Third, closely related to developing solid requests for assistance from the 
host nation is the task of getting a firm commitment for the end result, 
real programmatic change. Since the task of institutional reform may 
require a total restructuring of the current system, including the 
elimination of programs that are counterproductive, the complete 
cooperation of the senior leadership of the host nation is absolutely 
essential. This commitment must be obtained as soon after the US site 
survey assessment as possible.  
• Fourth, once the host nation has agreed to the concept of long-term 
reform, it is important that the US working team not get too far out 
ahead. Sensitivity is critical. Planners must take into account nationalistic 
and other characteristics peculiar to each military in developing a reform 
curriculum, whether in regard to military justice reform or human rights 
and law-of-war training.  
• Fifth, one idea that needs further exploration is the concept of increased 
regional military cooperation in rule-of-law reform initiatives. In the 
project on human rights and law-of-war training, for example, the Staff 
Judge Advocate's Office and the Human Rights Division of US Southern 
Command are now working in Venezuela using the Colombian handbook 
as a model. Further, at a subsequent conference in Caracas on military 
justice reform attended by 15 countries, Southern Command proposed the 
creation of an areawide, centrally located, JAG school. This school would 
teach military and operational law to Spanish-speaking military lawyers 
and would serve as the professional legal development school for the 
region. While few countries have the resources to run their own schools, 
they could instead contribute funds and other resources (for example, 
instructors and supplies) to such a cooperative school, and the United 
States could provide additional support and training to this one central 
program for legal education. Ultimately, the proposed school also could 
provide legal training to commanders and staff officers to sensitize them 
to the legal issues associated with military operations.  
• Sixth, as in all relations with foreign nations, one needs to be particularly 
sensitive to concerns from the opposite end of the domestic political 
spectrum in the host nation. In this vein, the possibility exists that an 
opposition group might seize on any US-assisted program as the opening 
wedge to advance its own anti-US agenda. Efforts to make the list of 
political participants and "organizers" as broad as possible are helpful in 
defusing this potential problem. In Colombia, the US team brought into 
the process as many civilian human rights groups as it could.  
• Seventh, a distinctive characteristic of a long-term program is the need to 
stay engaged. Indeed, quality control requires that the US military 
continue to monitor a program once it has been instituted. In this context, 
measurable standards for positive advancement need to be developed. 
This can be done by counting the number of soldiers trained and by 
closely following the reports of human rights violations. It is essential that 
contacts be maintained to allow the institutionalization to grow from the 
roots. Planners for future efforts must understand that such initiatives are 
not isolated events; tracking the program is just as critical as establishing 
the program. Measures of effectiveness must be developed and constantly 
analyzed to ensure that progress, however defined, is continually being 
made in protecting human rights, ensuring a procedurally fair and efficient 
military justice system, promoting the professional development of military 
lawyers, and--this is critical--cultivating an understanding and appreciation 
on the part of commanders and military leaders, civilian and uniformed, of 
the importance of seeking legal advice before initiating military operations.  
• Finally, as we have seen with the Colombian initiative, it is crucial to 
institutionalize and advocate the need for legal input in all phases of 
military operations and training. In this regard, the legal office arranged to 
have various Department of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
instructions and directives mandating legal reviews of all operation and 
concept plans translated into Spanish and distributed at a recent legal 
symposium. Further, the Staff Judge Advocate has personally provided 
copies to senior civilian and military leaders in Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, 
and Nicaragua, recommending that they be used as models for instituting 
mandatory legal reviews to ensure compliance with domestic and 
international law. Experience has demonstrated that it is only through top-
down, mandated change that the natural resistance to such efforts will 
eventually be overcome. Ultimately, without the full and willing 
participation of the military leadership, these changes will have shallow 
roots and be doomed to wither and fail.  
Conclusion  
In addressing the issue of promoting the rule of law in the militaries of Latin 
America, the empirical studies that have conclusively demonstrated the 
murderous behavior of totalitarian governments stand as a great motivator for 
reform. As former University of Hawaii Professor R. J. Rummel stated: "The way 
to end war and virtually eliminate 'democide' appears to be through restricting 
and checking power. This means to foster democratic freedom."[ 19]  
Through its legal engagement strategy, US Southern Command offers an 
innovative but realistic program that can make a difference by providing the 
lasting benefits of institutional democratic reform. By any standard of evaluation, 
the two initiatives discussed here stand as valuable models for offering 
meaningful help. For simplicity, focus, and potential for positive change, the legal 
engagement strategy has no equal--it targets institutional change and strives to 
ensure that the military forces of these new democracies are stake-holders and 
equal partners, if not leaders, in building and sustaining democratic reforms.  
If the United States is serious about promoting peace and human rights, it is 
time to abandon mere showcase approaches to supporting the rule of law. 
Rather, as Southern Command continues to demonstrate under the new 
Commander in Chief, General Peter Pace, it is time for the United States to seek 
great things, to roll up its sleeves and help enlarge the number of true 
democracies in the world community. The blueprint for success exists. One need 
look no further than Southern Command's legal engagement strategy and the 
Strategy of Cooperative Regional Peacetime Engagement it supports.  
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